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Abstract
Although Thomas More’s description of the Utopians’ ‘Epicurean’ position in
philosophy nominally coincides with Erasmus’s defence of the Philosophia
Christi, More shows no concern for the arguments Erasmus gave in support of
this view. Taking its starting point from Erasmus’s depreciations of the body
and More’s intellectual as well as physical preoccupations with the bodily
sphere, this article presents the theme of the human body and its moral and
religious significance as a test case for comparing Erasmus and More. The
treatises both men wrote on Christ’s suffering in the Garden of Gethsemane
confirm that both authors dealt with the notion of the body in contrasting
ways: Erasmus shows a tendency to address themoral-psychological question
of mentally conquering the worldly self, whilst More highlights the way in
which ordinary facts and physical things may carry spiritual and religious
meaning. Paradoxically, Erasmus consistently applied his spiritualized ideal of
man to this-worldly moral and social concerns, whereas More focused on the
physical domain out of a religious interest in transcendent truths. In line with
Giulia Sissa’s thesis, our hypothesis is that More ostensibly appropriated an
Erasmian type of idealism in Utopia, but, contrary to Erasmus himself, focused
on the exterior form of a virtuous society, rather than on its moral and spiritual
preconditions. While Erasmus advocated a mental transformation towards
reason, More’s Utopia envisioned what might come of this.
Keywords: Utopia, epicureanism, Philosophia Christi, the human body, Christ in
Gethsemane, humanism, spirituality, political idealism, moral history
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Introduction
Was Thomas More ever serious in Utopia? Giulia Sissa, who put forward
the idea that the book should be read as part of a literary interplay between
More and Erasmus in the wake of Erasmus’s Praise of Folly, offers good
arguments against taking its moral and political recommendations in any
straightforward way as Thomas More’s blueprint for a future society. If, as
Sissa argues, the figure of Hythloday is an impersonation of Erasmus, we
should not identify Thomas More with the idealist he portrays, but rather
‘distinguish as sharply as possible’ between ‘More’s authorship of Utopia’
and ‘[the main protagonist Raphael] Hythloday’s praise of Utopia’.１
In Sissa’s reading, More in fact makes fun of Erasmus, some of whose
outrageous moral and political ideals he magnifies in return for Erasmus’s
earlier implication of himself in the excessive mockery of society presented
in The Praise of Folly. In what follows, I shall have reason to come back to
the issue of how to read Utopia, and add further evidence in favour of
seeing More’s book as a playful counterpart to the Folly that takes Eras-
mus’s social program to the extreme. I shall not, however, attempt to
establish to what extent More himself may or may not have shared views
propounded in Utopia. Rather than to concentrate on similarities or differ-
ences in their political standpoints, I shall concentrate on the differences of
intellectual interest and religious susceptibilities in Erasmus and More.
For this, Utopia will lead the way. If the traveller to Utopia is an imper-
sonation of Erasmus２ – and a caricature at that –More’s book might seem
to offer no indication of his more serious views, no more than Erasmus’s
Folly might seem to offer straightforward signs of a position in moral phi-
losophy. As we shall see, however, a comparison between More’s Utopia
and Erasmus’s Folly in fact provides us with all relevant clues for a recon-
struction of Erasmus’s moral themes as well as of More’s affiliation to
these.
1 Sissa (2012: 139).
2 Note that the idea of identifying Raphael Hythloday as Erasmus also occurs in Vermeir (2012),
who also speculates about the possible relation between Erasmus’s notion of the common good
and provisions for good government enforced through the Blijde Inkomst, or ‘Joyous Entry’-
Charter of the Estates of Brabant of 1356. Finally, Mancel (2012) adds the names of the Portuguese
explorers Duarte Barbosa, next to Duarte Coehlo, as sources of inspiration for the character of the
Protuguese sailor in Utopia, and lists references to previous identifications of Raphael as Erasmus
(Mancel, 2012: 187-188).
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As I hope to make clear, More was remarkably insensitive to a core aspect
of Erasmus’s Philosophia Christi, or ‘Philosophy of Christ’. Tracing the moral
philosophical theme of the body and its pleasures, I shall argue that More
showed very little interest in the way in which Erasmus linked the philo-
sophical notion of mental detachment to a moral interpretation of the New
Testament message. More’s own moral and theological interests were very
different, and I shall illustrate the differences between the two humanists
on the basis of a comparison of the two parallel treatises in which Erasmus
and More both offered their theological views on the question of Jesus’s
sufferings in Gethsemane. Equally of relevance to the question of judging
the moral significance of the body, and unrecognisably far removed from
the satirical contexts of Utopia and the Folly, this comparison not only
confirms the differences between Erasmus and More, but also indicates a
theological incongruity in More that has struck other scholars as well:
More’s steady attention to the significance of the human body, besides
the soul, in matters of devotion.３
Contrasting More’s way of reflecting on the human body to the stark
Christo-Platonism of Erasmus’s Philosophia Christi, I also hope to point out
how these diverse ways of drawing attention to the physical world ironi-
cally illustrate a persistent focus on this-worldly mental aloofness in Eras-
mus, whilst More, for all his attention to the tangible world, had consider-
ably more otherworldly concerns. In conclusion, I will return to Utopia and
discuss the ways in which More and Erasmus may have captured the
modern imagination.
Let us begin, however, by taking a look at More’s references to the body
in Utopia.
3 In a recent volume of Moreana dedicated to ‘The Theology of Thomas More’, both Beier
(2015) and Kelly (2015) come to a similar conclusion. I shall refer to their work where appropriate.
Kelly also points out that two of the editors of some of More’s Tower Works in the Yale edition
made similar remarks. Thus, Clarence Miller, in his Introduction to De Tristitia, writes that ‘[one]
of More’s major concerns in the De Tristitia is the attentive reverence, mental and bodily, that
Christians ought to cultivate in their prayers’ (Miller, 1976b: 723; Kelly, 2015, 124). Reflecting on
their different ways of judging the significance of ceremonies, Garry E. Haupt even noted the
possibility that More had Erasmus in the back of his mind (Haupt, 1976: cxix; Kelly, 2015: 125):
‘Was More perhaps thinking of Erasmus’s platonizing when he, in effect turned the tables on the
extreme Platonists and insisted, using the Erasmian dichotomy, that ceremony is an aid, not an
enemy, to charity?’ As I hope to make clear in what follows, there is, indeed, every reason to
suggest that More may have been thinking of Erasmus when trying to mitigate purely Platonist
readings of Scripture.
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Utopia and Erasmus
What does Utopia have to say about the body and its pleasures? Apart from
the famous passage on the pre-marital inspection of each other’s naked
bodies by Utopian suitors in the company of ‘a sad and honest matron’ on
the girl’s and ‘a sage and discreet man’ on the young man’s side (a ‘very
fond and foolish’ custom to European eyes, in the words of our traveller,
Raphael Hythloday４), Utopia discusses dealings with the human body only
incidentally. At the same time, the book offers a fairly comprehensive
picture of the Utopian stance towards the pleasures of the body. In his
account of Utopian traditions in education, Hythloday discusses not only
the islanders’ interest in a variety of disciplines, but also the topic of Uto-
pian culture more generally, including an extensive discussion of moral
philosophical beliefs.
More has Hythloday recount the Utopians’ ethical standpoint in a for-
mat that readers with a knowledge of European moral history will recog-
nize as a variation on the Stoic-Epicurean debate on the question of ‘ends’.
Such a debate, including partisan evaluations of the relative weight of
virtue and pleasure in human happiness, had once inspired Cicero and
had since been revived in scholastic as well as humanist accounts of the
timeless debate on the summum bonum, most notably in Lorenzo Valla. In
terms of Greek philosophical standards, the Utopians present themselves
as Epicureans: they take pleasure to be the end of moral conduct and the
essential element in human happiness. In fact, according to Hythloday, the
Utopians
seem almost too much given and inclined to the opinion of them which defend
pleasure, wherein they determine either all or the chiefest part of man’s felicity
to rest.５
Raphael’s circumspect disclosure of Utopian partiality for Epicureanism is
a reason in itself to follow Giulia Sissa and conclude that More is dabbing
at Erasmus here. Erasmus himself would only come up with an outright
4 Quotation from Ralph Robinson’s 1551 translation, as included in the Rebhorn edition (More,
2005: 108). In the original, Raphael admits that we (as Europeans) find the practice ineptisimum
as well as ridiculum (More, 1965: 186, 188).
5 More (1965: 160); translation from More (2005: 92).
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identification of Christians and Epicureans in his 1533 colloquy ‘Epicureus’,
in which Hedonius, the champion of hedone (‘pleasure’), would argue that
‘there are no people more Epicurean than godly Christians.’６ Yet he had
dealt with Epicureanism much earlier, in De contemptu mundi (On Disdain-
ing the World), a work dating back to the late 1480s, and which, as Robert
Bultot argued already in 1969, should be characterized as a contribution to
the medieval custom of celebrating the joys of monastic life by comparing
the delights offered to those who had chosen for the monastery with the
pleasures promised in the Garden of Epicurus.
The use of this simile naturally implied that a champion of monasticism
sharply distinguished between the base pleasures usually associated with
classical Epicureanism and the higher pleasures monks were expected to
enjoy.７ Such a medieval, adapted version of Epicureanism, tailored to the
Christian need of advocating only higher pleasures, would remain Eras-
mus’s preferred interpretation of Epicureanism throughout the rest of his
life. Likewise, in the late colloquy ‘Epicureus’, Hedonius’ Epicureanism is
itself of this uncommon variety. Whereas Epicureans had traditionally
claimed that the end of all human endeavour might be subsumed under
a single concept of ‘pleasure’, Erasmus would always comply to the Chris-
tian rule of distancing himself from the original notion of hedone, and take
care to emphasize the contrast between what he regarded as common and
‘unlawful’ forms of pleasure, pleasures that only breed a wretched con-
science, and their alternative: the pleasures of the mind.８
Around the turn of the century, Erasmus changed his views about the
question whom this Epicureanism was meant for. Having become very
critical of monastery life not long after he had written De contemptu
mundi, he now cautioned his readers against overhasty choices in favour
6 Erasmus (1972: 721). Quotation from Erasmus (1997a: 1075). See also Erasmus (1965: 538).
7 Bultot (1969 : 230-233). Bultot offers a comparison between Erasmus’s view and that of John
of Salisbury (c. 1115-1176), who also contrasted what Bultot describes as the ‘earthly and ephem-
eral pseudo-values of vulgar Epicureanism’ to the ‘true, religious and supernatural values’ of the
‘true Epicurean’.
8 For the reference to ‘unlawful’ or ‘illegitimate’ pleasures, see Erasmus (1972: 727; 1965: 1081
and 1965: 544). Erasmus’s distinction between two types of pleasure, and his inclusion of an
Epicurean understanding of the ultimate good that was taken to refer to mental pleasures only,
would soon become a standard way of accepting the Epicurean position along with other philo-
sophical interpretations of moral virtue. See: van Ruler (2009a).
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of monastic life; and he changed the text of De contemptu mundi accord-
ingly.９ Far from rejecting his earlier spiritual ideals, however, he simply
tossed these over the walls of the cloister, in order to prescribe them to
society at large. Was not the whole world a monastery? Erasmus expressly
taught it should be so.１０ As a consequence, his understanding of Epicurean-
ism would, from this point onwards, show up in countless other contexts.
In his Education of a Christian Prince for instance, the book he published in
the same year in which he published More’s Utopia, Erasmus advised the
youthful prince that besides the more common pleasures, ‘there is another
kind of pleasure, which will last, pure and unchanging, all through a man’s
life.’ １１ The Praise of Folly, too, employs a twofold conception of pleasure of
which the lower kind is shunned by Christians, whilst the higher type is
represented by the pleasures of the mind. It is these latter pleasures which,
in this life, offer a foretaste of bliss in the hereafter.１２
The Praise of Folly has not without reason been held to add to this
Christian Epicureanism a further Epicurean element in the form of a sud-
den debunking of Stoic philosophers, and of other frivolities Erasmus al-
lows himself in the more humorous passages of the work. Since Erasmus’s
mockery of Stoicism in The Praise of Folly contrasts sharply with the Stoic
message he had earlier presented in the Enchiridion, the Handbook for the
Christian Soldier of 1503, it has been suggested that Erasmus had mean-
while developed a new interest in Epicureanism, inspired by Lorenzo Valla’s
9 After having left the monastry, Erasmus would often express sour views of monks and
monkhood and must at some point have decided he should adapt the text of De contemptu
mundi. The exact date of the twelfth chapter that he added is unknown, but it may have been
written well before the 1521 publication of the book. It is, on the other hand, most certainly a
post-1500 text. Cf. Rummel (1988: 132-133): ‘The number of conceptual and even verbal similarities
between chapter 12 and other Erasmian writings predating the publication of De contemptu
suggest that the epilogue goes back to an earlier period. Indeed, one is tempted to see in it the
fragments or salient points of a dissuasoria on the same topic composed in 1506 but now lost.’ On
the date of the various parts of the 1521 publication, as well as that of the original text, see also
Dresden (1977: 34-35).
10 The idea of the whole of Christianity ideally being ‘one monastery’, is a thought occurring
more frequently in Erasmus, for instance in the Letter to Servatius of 1514, Ep. 296, Erasmus (1906:
568), and in the Letter to Paul Volz that was to serve as a Preface to the 1518 edition of the
Enchiridion, Erasmus (1913: 374-376; 1933: 17-20).
11 Erasmus (1974: 144). Translation from Erasmus (1997b: 14).
12 Christians, according to Folly, avoid plesaures, yet delight in the spiritual pleasure that is a
fortaste of heavenly rewards. Note that Erasmus uses felicitas and praemii ( . . . ) illius ( . . . ) gustum
aut odorem aliquem rather than voluptas to refer to the higher pleasures in this context, and
corporis voluptates as well as diliciae for the lower kind of enjoyments. Erasmus (1979: 189, 192-
193).
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earlier defence of the philosophy.１３ As I have argued elsewhere, however,
Erasmus’s and Valla’s Epicureanisms ultimately stand worlds apart.１４
Bringing in his own quasi-Epicurean ideal of higher pleasures in the Plato-
nico-Christian finale of The Praise of Folly (a move that has the effect of a
sudden break and a remarkable change of atmosphere in the book), Eras-
mus simply returns to what had been his position all along, and takes up
the defence of the higher pleasures that accompany virtue as a guide for
self-conscious beings to make the right choices in life. His serious message
for society, in other words, remained exactly the same. Using the concept
of ‘pleasure’ in such a way that it was actually still quite compatible with
the Stoic notion of moral worth, Erasmus’s position, moreover, was as
consistent as – contrary to received opinion – it always was. Despite his
jocular pestering of the stony Stoics in The Praise of Folly, he would never
seriously denounce Stoicism as a faulty moral doctrine.
In Utopia, Hythloday captures Erasmus’s position rather neatly by pro-
viding only a fuzzy opposition between the Utopian defence of Epicurean
values and what is here presented as ‘the contrary opinion’, the one that
favours ‘virtue’ and a ‘life ordered according to nature’ – the Utopian coun-
terpart, in other words, of Stoicism. The text in fact describes both posi-
tions in favourable terms.１５ Taking away the sharp edges of Epicureanism
by arguing that the Utopians ‘think not felicity to rest in all pleasure, but
only in that pleasure that is good and honest’, and arguing that, if our
reasonable nature kindles in us a love of God and of our fellow men, no
less should it be thought to encourage self-help, More in fact gives credit to
the Stoic way of thinking even when explaining Utopian Epicureanism.１６
13 See Panizza (1995). Rather than being ‘the last word in the oscillation between Stoic and
Epicurean emphases in Erasmus’ thought’, James D. Tracy, however, argued Erasmus developed a
more sympathetic stance towards the masses in between the Enchiridion and the Folly (Tracy,
1972: 124).
14 The Praise of Folly may rightfully be compared to Valla’s De voluptate / De vero bono not
because Erasmus takes over Valla’s position, but because, if we group together the Folly with the
preceding Enchiridion, and distinguish within the text of the Folly itself between the playful anti-
Stoicism of the first part and Folly’s very serious finale, we do indeed find a triptych in the
contents of these works that may count as a variation on the Ciceronian format of a Stoic-
Epicurean debate on ends. Erasmus, in other words, never copied Valla’s position, as neither
Valla copied Cicero’s, but he may well have copied the general set-up. See van Ruler (2009b).
15 See also Mancel (2012: 187): ‘Nous pourrions aller jusqu’à proposer que la philosophie des
Utopiens dont Hythlodée est plutôt admiratif, rappelle étrangement l’épicurisme vaguement
mâtiné de stoïcisme loué et recommandé par Érasme dans son De Contemptu Mundi.’
16 More (1965 : 162; 2005 : 93).
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More may have tried to pick up other aspects of Erasmus’s moral philoso-
phy as well. As said (and as Erasmus himself would claim), despite its
peculiar style and content, The Praise of Folly remained true to what had
been Erasmus’s standpoint in the Enchiridion.１７ It would still be his posi-
tion in the colloquy on Epicureanism as late as 1533. Yet there were many
ways in which Erasmus might dress up his moral philosophical views. If, at
times, he defended his position in Epicurean terms, he in fact taught a
Platonising and spiritualized form of Epicureanism, and one he held to be
compatible not only with all of the major philosophical schools of anti-
quity, but with the New Testament message as well. For Erasmus, the
Christian-Epicurean view that there were higher pleasures to be gained
by leading a moral life coincided with what he regarded as the combined
message of Greek moral philosophy and Christian theology alike. Along
with Platonism and Stoicism, Epicureanism only provided another inter-
pretative scheme with the help of which the application of philosophical
reason to all areas of life (and the mental pleasure this was thought to
generate) might be contrasted to non-philosophical and non-religious
mental attitudes.１８ This moral dualism, moreover, was based on a firm
belief in the strict dualism of body and mind, since, according to a wide-
spread philosophical belief, the use of reason was thought to be impaired
only by a mental allegiance to the comforting pleasures associated with the
bodily sphere that might obfuscate a clear view of the moral good and thus
prevent the agent from attaining a fully rational position. Taking the New
Testament contrast between ‘the spirit’ and ‘the flesh’ to be a Biblical
counterpart to the philosophical distinction of body and mind, Erasmus
not only gave a combined, Platonic interpretation to the major philosophi-
cal schools of antiquity, but also held the central message of Greek philo-
sophy to be wholly in tune with the New Testament. Indeed, in The Educa-
tion of a Christian Prince, he even went so far as to profess that ‘[being] a
philosopher is in practice the same as being a Christian; only the terminol-
ogy is different.’ １９
When Thomas More accordingly tells us in Utopia that the Utopians
‘seem almost too much given and inclined to the opinion of them which
defend pleasure’; that they curiously defend ‘so dainty and delicate an
17 See the Letter to Maarten van Dorp, Ep. 337, Erasmus (1910: 93): ‘Nec aliud agitur in Moria sub
specie lusus quam actum est in Enchiridio.’
18 Though not always very enthusiastic about Aristotelianism, Erasmus even counted the Peri-
patetic philosophy as a source of philosophical morality, at least in the Enchiridion. Cf. Erasmus
(1933: 44). On Erasmus’s relation to Aristotle, see: Steel (2009).
19 Erasmus (1974 : 145). Translation from Erasmus (1997b: 15).
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opinion’ on arguments taken from their ‘grave, sharp, bitter [i.e., severe]
and rigorous religion’; and never even discuss ‘felicity or blessedness’ with-
out mixing religion and philosophy, joining ‘unto the reasons of philoso-
phy certain principles taken out of religion,’ there is every reason to believe
that a mock portrait of Erasmus is here being drawn up in the figure of
Raphael Hythloday.２０
At the same time, the way in which Raphael describes the Utopian
counterpart to Erasmian Epicureanism suggests that More had no concern
for the way in which Erasmus himself would have explained and defended
this position. In linking Hythloday to Erasmus, Giulia Sissa has argued that
the curious mishmash of a philosophy at once Epicurean and Platonic not
only uniquely fits Erasmus, but that it is also a position More deliberately
presents as ultimately indefensible. ‘Hythloday’s argument’, according to
Sissa, is ‘provocative and oxymoronic’; indeed, ‘the whole Utopian blend of
Epicureanism and Platonism [. . . ] should strike us as utterly absurd.’２１
No doubt More himself thought so, too. Yet whether or not he con-
sciously presented the queer notion of a Platonic kind of Epicureanism as
a blatant absurdity, he could only do so by disregarding some of the essen-
tial elements of Erasmus’s actual position. While, on the outside, the Uto-
pian position in moral philosophy fits Erasmus’s standpoint in terms of its
labels, its mixture of schools and its alignment of philosophy and religion,
Hythloday never really ventures to explain in which way these seemingly
incompatible labels, schools and areas might combine as they do in Eras-
mus.
Likewise, in order to explain the idea of a combined philosophico-reli-
gious position, More offers only an assortment of the most general religious
notions compatible with philosophical views:
that the soul is immortal and by the bountiful goodness of God ordained to
felicity, that to our virtues and good deeds rewards be appointed after this life
and to our evil deeds punishments.２２
Explaining Utopian Epicureanism in these terms, More completely by-
passes what Erasmus had in mind when presenting himself and his fellow
Christians as followers of Epicurus. Nor does More seem very interested in
the niceties of Erasmus’s interpretation of Epicureanism. In fact, in describ-
20 More (1965: 160); quotations from More (2005: 92).
21 Sissa (2012: 126-127).
22 More (1965: 160); quotation from More (2005: 92).
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ing this ‘religious’ and Utopian form of Epicureanism, More freely plunges
into his own stock of associations. His enumeration of non-profitable, i.e.
‘foolish’ pleasures, for instance, though it may bring to mind Erasmus’s
mockery of social norms in The Praise of Folly, actually testifies to a typi-
cally Morean interest in gluttony, greed and pride, rather than that it offers
an Erasmian analysis of lower pleasures. Moreover, though Utopia’s de-
scription of the pleasures of the mind may remind us of the association
Erasmus would later make between illegitimate pleasures and con-
science,２３ bodily pleasures are here explained along the lines of classical
Epicureanism, that is to say in terms of dynamic versus static pleasures and
of pleasure in general being defined in contrast to pain２４ – all of which
elements are wholly lacking in Erasmus. Nor, finally, do Hythloday’s ‘Epi-
curean’ interests in the health, sensual awareness and aesthetics of the
human body have anything in common with Erasmian moral philosophy.２５
Indeed, the whole idea of Erasmian Epicureanism had been to draw the
attention away from the body and to focus on mental pleasures alone.
Body and mind
A strong Platonic dualism pervades all of Erasmus’s references to Epicur-
eanism, as well as his dealings with Stoicism and his interpretation of the
New Testament – indeed all of his philosophical and theological thought.
Already in the 1503 Enchiridion, Erasmus had paraphrased biblical expres-
sions from St. Paul, translated them into Greek philosophical language,
and used these to interpret spiritual salvation in terms of philosophical
detachment. To him, the Platonic distinction of body and mind and the
New Testament distinction between the flesh and the spirit exemplified
similar anthropological views, with similar moral consequences:
23 That is to say, in his ‘Epicureus’ colloquy of 1533; see above, note 8.
24 More (1965: 172/173-174/175). Note, however, that More does not seem to follow the Epicur-
eans in their identification of pleasure as an ‘absence of pain’, at least not if there is no ‘presence
of health’: ‘The absence of pain without the presence of health [the Utopians] regard as insensi-
bility rather than pleasure.’ More (1965: 175). See Guido Giglioni’s article, pp. 399-400, below.
25 Cf. More (1965: 174/175-178/179).
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Paul is engrossed in this point, that we should spurn the strife-ridden flesh and
be firm in the spirit, the begetter of love and liberty. On the one hand, the flesh,
bondage, unrest, contention are inseparable companions; on the other, the
spirit, peace, love, freedom. This is what the Apostle teaches everywhere.２６
Again, according to the Enchiridion, all details about the philosophical
battle between reason and the passions
are taught in the Holy Scriptures, though not in the same terms. What the
philosophers call reason Paul sometimes refers to as spirit, sometimes as the
inner man, sometimes as the law of the mind. What they call passions he now
calls the flesh, now the body, now the outward man, now the law of bodily
members.２７
The result is a very literal form of moral dualism in Erasmus: reason, virtue
and piety on the one hand, passion, vice and sin on the other. And since
what hindered reason, at least according to the position of classical philo-
sophy, were the passions associated with the body, the human body, in
Erasmus, too, is consistently interpreted in a negative sense; as an ‘insepar-
able’２８ source of unrest, and an incessant obstacle to moral enlightenment
and religious salvation.
Erasmus further developed this schematisation of traditional moral
philosophical and religious intuitions into a theory of mental incentives
centred around the Platonic idea of the tripartite soul. Reason, itself iden-
tified as the ‘immortal soul’, is situated in ‘the loftiest part of the body
[and] the one closest to heaven’, while ‘the sensual appetite, which lusts
for the pleasure of food and drink and which drives us into erotic love’ has
its place in lower regions, far from ‘that divine counsellor presiding in the
lofty citadel ( . . . ).’２９ Reinterpreting the middle soul in which Plato had seen
a natural attendant of reason, Erasmus sometimes evoked the idea of a
neutral ‘heart’ or ‘soul’ (anima３０) caught in between the high-rising spirit
and the lowly flesh. At other times, however, he interpreted this middle
part of the soul as a second level of awareness that, despite the Platonic
26 Erasmus (1933: 82). Translation from Erasmus (1963: 121).
27 Erasmus (1933: 47). Translation from Erasmus (1963: 72).
28 See the quotation referred to in note 26, above.
29 Erasmus (1933 : 43-44). Translation from Erasmus (1963: 66-67).
30 See, for instance, Erasmus (1933: 53).
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characterisation of this part as the ‘nobility’ within the republic of the
mind, Erasmus interpreted in a wholly non-Platonic way as the seat of
non-rational factors that may influence human thought and conduct in a
manner neither reprehensible nor praiseworthy, but simply natural.３１
Thomas More had his own particular ways of talking about the body. In
an issue of Moreana especially dedicated to the subject of the flesh, Ger-
main Marc’hadour enumerated a variety of different ways in which the
human body is explicitly dealt with in More, including religious and
moral justifications of the belief that the death of the body is of minor
significance in comparison to the life beyond; the Platonically inspired
theme (also occurring in Erasmus’s Praise of Folly) that life is a prepara-
tion for death; the medico-religious conviction, rather prominent in
More, that the number of deaths as a result of drinking and eating habits
easily exceeds the number of deaths by the sword; as well as a great
variety of gluttony-related arguments More had a particular propensity
to dwell on.３２ Finally, since he had a taste for drama both in dress and in
demeanour, as well as for overt displays of affection, Marc’hadour also
notices a certain susceptibility to ‘symbolic action’ in More, an aspect of
his personality that Marc’hadour seamlessly links to the way in which, for
More, physical appearances were intertwined with religious susceptibil-
ities. According to Marc’hadour, More was a ‘great actor, in a sacramental
world’.３３
Besides for his ways of attaching symbolic meaning to the human body,
Thomas More is also well-known, at least in scholarly circles, for the way in
which he handled his own. As a piece of uncomfortable undergarment, his
famous ‘hair-shirt’ became the trade-mark of his spiritual mentality, and
More is famous besides for having practiced at home the flagellation rou-
tine he would continue in his Tower cell. Although it is difficult to estimate
how More himself may have experienced and valued these practices, he no
doubt saw them as expressions of his religiosity. Pious inspiration for
scourging his body may well have been inspired by one or more of his
31 See, for instance, Erasmus (1933: 42) and Erasmus (1979: 171).
32 Marc’hadour (2006-2007). Note that the three bodies Marc’hadour’s title refers to are the
physical body of man, the eucharist body of Christ, and the mystical body of the Church.
33 Marc’hadour (2006-2007: 104).
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intellectual heroes, such as Thomas à Kempis or Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola.３４ Yet whether or not it was on the authority of others that
More sought discomfort and pain, and for whatever intentional reason he
did so, we are probably safe to conclude that he must have drawn some
emotional stability from being aware of his own body by bearing up with
the uncomfortable shirt and by thrashing himself at regular intervals.
The fact of the matter is, that although such practices are nowadays
more likely to be interpreted in a sexual context, they have previously
been interpreted almost exclusively in terms of a depreciation of the
body’s sway over the mind, and especially as a form of reducing sexual
arousal.３５ Questioning the biographical value of what Erasmus has told us
about the reasons More might have had for renouncing the monastery in
favour of a professional career, recent biographers have shown themselves
to be disinclined to link More’s presumed sexual unease to his bigger
choices in life.３６ Such caution is well-grounded in itself. From the scant
evidence that we have concerning More’s sexual drive (and here, too, Eras-
mus may indirectly have been teasing his friend３７), we cannot, indeed,
draw any conclusions as to the specific doubts and concerns More may
have associated with his sexual inclinations. Yet this does not mean we
may not draw other conclusions. We may still, for instance, deduce from
34 The teachings of Thomas à Kempis, whose moving expressions of medieval piety greatly
inspired More at least for a certain period of his life, may have influenced him to take strong
measures with respect to the subjection of the flesh (Ackroyd, 1998: 98). Arguing that, rather than
having been a student of the Heptaplus, of the famous lecture De dignitate hominis, or of any of
Giovanni Pico’s other major works, More’s interest in the celebrated Florentine syncretist was
inspired rather by the book that he partly translated into English, Gianfrancesco Pico’s Life of his
renowned uncle, J.B. Trapp also pointed towards Pico. ‘Clear also,’ according to Trapp (Trapp,
1991: 127), ‘in the letters as in the duodecalogues [writings by Giovanni Pico that More also
translated], is Pico’s continuing preoccupation, which was also More’s, with the need to resist
the ‘cuppes of Circe, that is to saie . . . the sensual affections of the flesh’ by, among other things,
the mortification of that flesh practiced by both [Pico and More].’
35 The interpretation originally derives from More’s first biographers, who alleged that More
started wearing the shirt in the sexually most troublesome years of his beginning adulthood. Cf.
Ackroyd (1998: 66).
36 The tendency to supress speculation on the issue has been argued either on the basis of an
appraisal of More’s sense of duty and ambition (Ackroyd, 1998: 99-100), or on the basis of a
broader scepticism about the possibility ever to uncover the intentions of our protagonist (Guy,
2000: 28-39).
37 Note that speculations about More’s reasons for pursuing a civil career after he had stood on
the threshold of the monastery in 1505 were encouraged by Erasmus’s comments, in a letter to
Ulrich von Hutten of 1519, that More had not entered the monastery because he had had a greater
wish to get married – and thus to be a good husband, rather than ‘an impure priest’. Cf. Ep. 999,
Erasmus (1922: 18).
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the evidence we have that Thomas More had an acute awareness of his
own body and its urges. Rather more to the point with respect to our
present purposes, we may suspect that if public display played such a role
in More’s daily life and if penitence was such an important part of his
experience of religion, a far different appreciation of the spiritual relevance
of the human body and its engagement in religious life is to be expected in
More than in Erasmus, who, ever since he left the monastery only to
project an idealised conception of its essence on society at large, would
continue to propagate his moral ideals in terms of a mental transformation
towards a truly spiritualized form of life – the only stance that might serve
as a precondition to moral and social reform according to Erasmus.
More’s spiritual writings do, indeed, indicate that the Englishman had
very different religious concerns. A fine comparison between Erasmus’s
rather more ‘moral’ and More’s more ‘spiritual’ interests may be made on
the basis of the tracts they both wrote on the subject of Christ’s agony in
the garden of Gethsemane. Early on in his career, this was a subject Eras-
mus had used in order to develop his interpretation of the soul’s triparti-
tion and its potential to redirect itself away from the bodily sphere – a
theme not only missing in More, but actually at odds with More’s way of
reading symbolic meaning into the story of Gethsemane.
Lessons from Christ’s suffering
Christ’s suffering in the garden of Gethsemane pending his torture, cruci-
fixion, and death is one of Christianity’s most dramatic, but also one of its
most paradoxical tales. Three of the four New Testament gospels refer to
Christ’s agony. All three testify that Jesus despaired: he was ‘sorrowful and
very heavy’, ‘sorrowful unto death’, even ‘in agony’. All three gospels, Mat-
thew, Mark and Luke, report the famous words with which Jesus asked his
Father to ‘let this cup pass from me’. All three recount the words attesting
to Christ’s eventual acceptance of his plight: ‘nevertheless, not my will, but
thine, be done.’３８ Luke even tells us that Christ’s agony was so great he
sweated blood.３９ The enigma, and the main reason for so much theological
effort being spent on the explanation of Christ’s agony, was that there
seemed to be no reason for Christ, who is divine, all-knowing and without
any sin, to experience any distress. Did he have second thoughts, as it
38 Cf. Matthew 26:36-46; Mark 14:32-42; Luke 22:39-46.
39 Luke 22:44.
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were? Did he try to prevent God from executing what was in stall for him?
Did he actually implore his Father to blow the whole thing off? Had he no
determination? Was the Son of God reluctant and less brave, apparently,
than all those later Christian martyrs who courageously faced and often
cheerfully underwent their cruel executions?
Erasmus and More both discussed the New Testament scene in detail,
but even More’s style is very different from Erasmus’s.４０ Of course, the
circumstances in which they were composed – a young Erasmus motivated
by the challenge of debating with John Colet on a new area of intellectual
inspiration; the old, imprisoned More trying to encourage and reassure
himself more than anyone else in preparation for his own impending ex-
ecution – may explain many of the differences between the two works.
Erasmus’s Disputatiuncula, or Short Debate Concerning the Distress, Alarm,
and Sorrow of Jesus of 1503, is a polemical work, whilst De Tristitia Christi,
or The Sadness of Christ (1535), More’s final essay, was arguably the least
academic of his works. Written in his Tower cell, this meditation on
Christ’s suffering was deliberately intended to ease his own torment and
the misery of his imprisonment.４１
This does not alter the fact that both treatises offer a fine illustration of
the varying ways in which the two humanists theologically employed their
mind-body dialectics. As the editor and translator of De Tristitia Clarence
Miller has argued, the clarity alone with which the text of More’s manu-
script was produced ‘should serve to correct any tendency to overstress the
purely personal and biographical significance’ of the work.４２ Moreover,
even if More, when writing De Tristitia, was primarily concerned with
consoling himself, it is not in this regard that his text differs from Eras-
mus’s. Had Erasmus primarily been playing the intellectual game of dis-
puting subtle theoretical points with fellow theologians, More’s aim was
clearly not so much to draw on the comparison between himself and
Christ, but rather to produce a more indirect form of consolation and
inspiration for author and reader alike. At every stage in its argument, De
40 Erasmus is so smart as to tackle his potential critics in advance by admitting that his own
base rhetoric cannot compare to the deep theological knowledge of his friend John Colet, to
whom his essay was initially addressed. Cf. Erasmus (1704: 1290; 1988: 66). More, by contrast,
employs rhetorical techniques not so much in order to strengthen his argument, but to kindle the
imagination of his readers, and thus to bring about a shared amazement at the facts and details
of the story recalled.
41 See the Letter to Margaret, nr. 56, in More (1961: 225). On the creation of the book during
More’s confinement, see also Miller (1976), as well as Baker House (2008).
42 Miller (1976: 748).
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Tristitia seems committed to moving the reader – and, no doubt, the
author himself – towards a sense of wonder at the deep truth of Scripture.
As Marie-Claire Phélippeau has written:
Even in his most moving passages, the Sadness of Christ, for instance, More
writes for an audience, giving lessons, inciting his readers to believe and pray,
and to reform their souls. More writes in the pastoral ( . . . ) mode.４３
Besides this, we also see a clear theoretical parting of ways, in that Erasmus
and More apply the dualism of body and mind, the Platonic theme they
were equally prone to read into the New Testament dualism of the flesh
and the spirit, in wholly divergent ways. It was in his Short Debate Con-
cerning the Distress, Alarm, and Sorrow of Jesus, in fact, that Erasmus initi-
ally took up his Platonic anthropology in order not only to explain the
effects of a partly human nature that might solve the riddle of Christ’s
suffering, but also to explain in detail the differences that separate Christ’s
position from ours. In reaction to an alternative reading that had been
accepted by John Colet, and according to which Christ’s agony was not
occasioned by his impending torture and death, but by a concern for the
fateful future of the Jews, the lot of the apostles and the pending doom over
the city of Jerusalem, Erasmus defended the more common-sense view
according to which Jesus simply feared his own predicament. Erasmus
thus attributed human emotions to Jesus, and interpreted Jesus’s suffering
as a personal sacrifice that allows humans to identify themselves with
Christ, to sympathize with him, and to see him as an example to be fol-
lowed.
Such an interpretation naturally implied that Erasmus highlighted the
notion of Christ’s double nature: both human and divine. This in itself was
a standard element in scholastic theology, and Erasmus made sure expli-
citly to mention his allegiance to the scholastics in this matter.４４ What the
Disputatiuncula added to such long-standing theological views was a phi-
losophical comparison between the mind of Christ and those of ordinary
human beings.
Despite being human, Christ was not, of course, merely human. This,
amongst other things, traditionally explained the obvious difference there
is between Jesus’s agony and the courageousness of human martyrs:
whereas martyrs may receive divinely induced forms of support, Jesus –
43 Phélippeau (2015: 144).
44 Erasmus (1704: 1290; 1988: 66).
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at least in this particular context; the context of the Passion – wishes to
emphasize his humanity.４５ In Erasmus, this leads to further psycho-philo-
sophical speculations about how this works, and to an explanation of the
way in which Jesus and common mortals differ. In order not to have to
attribute sinful weaknesses to Jesus, Erasmus emphasized that Christ ex-
perienced only natural fears and it is here that he presents the full arma-
ture of his Platonic anthropology, drawing a sharp line between the ‘nat-
ural’ and the ‘moral’ realms, coinciding with the division between realms
that are relevant and realms that are indifferent to questions of morality.４６
The point is that Jesus never needed lower drives to experience genuine
fear, since the fear of death, for instance, may be experienced purely on the
basis of the neutral ‘middle’ soul.
Focusing next on the question of overcoming fears and steering one’s
own conduct, the Platonic anthropology also occasioned Erasmus to add
some conclusions on morality as such. The crucial difference between
Jesus and humans with respect to the way in which indecision and a
wavering of the will may be handled, is that Jesus may allow conflicting
mental propensities to continue to exist within his mind without any con-
sequence to his ulterior behaviour. He may at once experience the type of
human feelings with which he is able to identify with us – and with which
he is able to appeal to our imagination – and still keep himself from being
led astray by them, since he will always choose to act according to his
divine nature and will. Thus, in Christ, two natures may lead to conflicting
experiences without any loss of serenity. As Erasmus puts it, Jesus ‘feared
death, and did not fear it. He dreaded it, and did not. He desired it, and did
not.’４７
In man, however, conquering the self is not that easy. Indeed, in human
experience, genuine conflicts arise, as the one proclivity tends to extin-
guish the other. Our passions, accordingly, may overpower us. And even if
they do not, there is still an ongoing struggle between our various inclina-
tions, and always a fight to be won. Erasmus thus comes to reflect on our
own moral selves through the example of Jesus. Contrary to present-day
emotivist conceptions of morality, he held that it is only mental struggles
that delineate the realm of the moral. To fight one’s inclinations, appetites
45 Accordingly, even though a lesser charity could help martyrs overcome their agony, the
infinitely greater charity and highest pleasure in Christ himself to comply with divine will and
thus save humanity, could exist in Christ alongside the most horrific pains he experienced in so
far as he was human. Cf. Erasmus (1704: 1279; 1988: 43).
46 Erasmus (1704: 1272; 1988: 27-28).
47 Erasmus (1704: 1283). Translation from Erasmus (1998: 52).
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and temptations calls for a special effort, a form of bravery that may make
us virtuous. No virtue, however, is found in following one’s natural endow-
ments. The greater one’s dread, the more virtuous one’s ultimate bravery.４８
And since it is only by conquering ‘lower’ drives that human virtue may
exert itself, Erasmus estimates that, contrary to the case of Jesus, human
mental battles will never end, but will continue throughout life – which,
for Erasmus, is a reason to revert to the Stoic example of the soldier who is
judged for either defending or leaving his post – never for crying or for
turning pale.４９
Like Erasmus, More attributed human emotions to Jesus and saw his
suffering as a source of moral inspiration. Like Erasmus, he also distin-
guished Jesus’s plight from that of human martyrs and highlighted the
double nature of Christ. Nor was More an average theologian himself.
Indeed, searching for hidden truth in Scripture, he does more, in De Tristi-
tia, than simply weave symbolic meaning into the facts of the biblical story.
Rather, Christology turns into metaphysics here, as More continuously
emphasises that there are two separate realms of activity in Jesus’s hand-
ling of the situation in Gethsemane: the worldly and the divine. From this
viewpoint, More frankly addresses sceptical objections as well, such as the
question why Jesus, if he truly is God, should return to his disciples after
having prayed further afield no less than three times, only to find them
sleeping. Why should he have to express his wish for them to stay awake, if
he could see to this himself? Being God, why did he not simply enforce
what he was now repeatedly asking for with such an apparent lack of
success? More’s answer is that there is such a thing as wishing and wishing:
of course Christ can accomplish his own wishes ‘in an absolute and un-
qualified sense.’ In the present case, however, Jesus’s wish is qualified, since
the wish for his disciples to comply involves his wishing that they wish the
same themselves.５０
Even within Divine Will, one may thus distinguish absolute from quali-
fied demands, and God’s wish for us to cooperate and to comply, is a
qualified wish. In More’s analysis, however, such a standard philosophical
distinction forms part of a broader strategy with which he aims to highlight
the dual character of recounted facts and their deeper meaning. Indeed,
the whole story of Gethsemane would be pointless without the duality of
Christ, who, as God, aims to awaken in us a trust, inspired by the example
48 Cf. Erasmus (1704: 1275; 1988: 34-35).
49 Erasmus (1704: 1273; 1988: 30).
50 More (1976b: 199; 1993: 34).
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he presents to us – as man. The meaning conveyed in the angel coming
down to console Christ is, accordingly, not to detract from Christ’s divinity.
Rather, ‘just as He wished to undergo sadness and anxiety for our sake, so
too for our sake He wished to have an angel console Him’; it is both to
show himself as ‘truly man’ and to ‘give us hope’ that we, too, may receive
consolation (provided that we imitate him by ‘sighing and praying from
the bottom of our hearts’, as More typically adds), that the angel comes to
play a role as well.５１
At other instances, Jesus may simultaneously be acting out both sides of
his twofold nature – a tactic that More makes fully explicit where, in the
Biblical account of Gethsemane, Christ takes the lead in the process of his
own capture, and, ‘coming up close to the crowd, asks “Whom do you
seek?”’ When the cohort replies ‘Jesus of Nazareth’, he tells them: ‘I am
He’,５２ and More now tells his readers how mistaken it was in the first
place to object to an apparent weakness in Christ; look at the courage he
now shows! It was, in effect, an overwhelming display of courage, since, as
Scripture recalls, all those who attended ‘drew back and fell to the
ground.’５３
This particular passage incites More to reflect on the disparity between
Jesus and the others present at Gethsemane, since it is exactly by revealing
himself through the physical body of a human being that ‘Christ proved
that He truly is that word of God which pierces more sharply than any two-
edged sword.’５４ The original manuscript of De Tristitia proves that More
considered adding further symbolic interpretations of the crowd’s fearful
reaction to Jesus, but ultimately chose not to speculate on its relevance for
questions of the afterlife. If, however, it is More’s custom to concentrate on
Old Testament similarities and on moral interpretations, rather than on
speculations concerning the life beyond,５５ we must understand ‘moral’
here to mean ‘inspirational’ in a very broad sense. There is no tendency in
More to develop a fuller understanding of human morality as such – not, at
least, in the way Erasmus did when he made use of the events at Gethse-
mane for drawing a comparison between human conduct and divine.
Rather than the contrast between the human and the divine, it is the
51 More (1976b: 225 and 227; 1993: 39).
52 More (1976b: 417; 1993: 75).
53 More (1976b: 417 and 425; 1993: 75 and 77).
54 More (1976b: 425; 1993: 77).
55 Cf. Clarence Miller, who writes, with respect to More’s deleted jottings in the manuscript,
that ‘( . . . ) they belong to the anagogical level of interpretation, whereas More, when he goes
beyond the literal, seems to prefer the typological and tropological.’ Miller (1976: 751).
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combination of divine and human aspects in Christ that carries most sig-
nificance for More, just as he shows a tendency in De Tristitia to find
meaning in the combination of the mental and the physical, the body
and the mind, rather than in the contrast between them. References to
the body occur in De Tristitia for instance with respect to typical Morean
themes such as the pre-eminence of the eternal life over the present. Like-
wise, the conclusion of his curiously elaborate discussion regarding the
identity of the youngster who ran away naked from the scene at Gethse-
mane, is that the death of the body is of no great significance, since the
body may be shrugged off as easily as a loincloth.５６
De Tristitia, however, is never disparaging of the body as such, nor of its
moral significance. As Benjamin Beier noted with respect to the young
man fleeing naked from the Garden of Gethsemane, the body is expressly
described as a ‘garment’ of the soul here, and is used to announce the ‘new
body’ to be won in the hereafter.５７ More’s theological interest in the body
has struck other scholars as well. Michael Kelly recently argued that, for
More, ‘[salvation] is not for souls alone’,５８ whilst Beier went on to observe
that More ‘manifests a particular interest in and appreciation for the body
as a consecutive part of the whole human being.’５９ This, indeed, is a sig-
nificant feature of De Tristitia in comparison to Erasmus’s treatment of
Gethsemane. More’s treatise, in fact, touches upon the idea of a spiritual
coordination of body and mind in a very explicit way where More evokes
the topic of symbolic meaning, a topic for which the story of Christ’s vigil
and arrest is eminently suited, as it hinges on the dualism of Christ’s nature
– and thus on the duality between the worldly and the divine.６０
The point comes out sharply where More addresses the story of Peter
severing Malchus’s ear in a powerless attempt to change the divinely or-
dained course of things. According to all four gospel accounts, Christ at this
point rebukes Peter for attempting to prevent what the arrest team have
come to do, namely to seize him and to take him away. ‘Do you not know,’
Christ asks his overenthusiastic disciple according to the gospel of Mat-
56 More (1976b: 565-617; 1993; 104-112). The conclusion deals with a theme also mentioned by
Marc’hadour in his enumeration of topics More habitually associated with the body. See note 32,
above.
57 Beier (2015: 89-90); More (1976b: 605; 1993; 110-111).
58 Kelly (2015: 128).
59 Beier (2015: 84).
60 Beier adds that the analogy itself between Christ’s humanity and the human body (More,
1976b: 181; 1993: 30) ‘ensures the body’s dignity’ – a confirmation of More’s way of valuing the
body’s spiritual significance in De Tristitia that I had not noticed myself. Cf. Beier (2015: 88).
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thew, ‘that I could ask my Father for help and He would immediately
deliver to me more than twelve legions of angels?’６１ To set himself free,
Jesus had much better options, in other words, than to let Peter cut off
Malchus’s ear. The point is that this is not what is supposed to happen
from God’s point of view. In order to stifle any speculation as to why he
would not save himself, Christ rhetorically asks how otherwise the Scrip-
tures would be fulfilled that ‘say this is the way it must be’.６２ More neatly
contrasts Peter’s ill-timed worldly engagement with the divinely ordained
course of things by arguing that what Peter attempts to solve on the level of
human accomplishment goes against what, on a higher plan, God has in
store for humanity at large. In staging the events at Gethsemane, God
occasions what is crucial to the salvation of mankind, and even if, like
Peter, we try with good intentions to interfere on Christ’s behalf, such
human acts will always be weighed against the divine plan that may lie
hidden, but is everywhere alluded to in Holy Writ.
The story of Malchus’s ear occasions More to find further layers of
Scriptural symbolism that need not concern us here.６３ What does matter,
is that despite a Platonically-inspired moment in which he associates the
name of ‘Malchus’ (meaning ‘King’) with the notion of Reason, More is not
at all tempted to develop a Platonic account of higher and lower mental
drives in man, as Erasmus would certainly have been tempted to do at this
point. More, by contrast, has his own way of inserting the topic of mind
and body into the passage, making explicit the comparison between body
and soul on the one hand, and literal and allegorical meanings of Scripture
– or, as More puts it, ‘spiritual mysteries’ – on the other. The story of
Malchus’s ear brings More to such levels of hidden meaning, that it
comes to be more than simply an example of literal happenings and hid-
den implications. For More, it is also an occasion to discuss the more
general theme of divine mysteries continually adding to the literal account
of Biblical events, and it is the all-pervading and enlivening power of the
soul that is here compared to the omnipresence of deeper layers of mean-
ing in Scripture. Indeed, as More puts it, ‘no factual account in all of
61 More (1976b: 495; 1993; 91). Cf. Matthew 26:53.
62 More (1976b: 501; 1993; 92). Cf. Matthew 26:54.
63 With respect to Malchus, More develops a line of argument that is actually rather farfetched
in its way of seeking symbolic meaning. Indeed, the reference to the notion of reason through the
name of Malchus, who ought to have obeyed this ‘King’ instead of rebelling against him, is almost
awkward in its way of taking Malchus himself for the divine road he should follow. More (1976b:
509-515; 1993; 93-95).
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Scripture is so gross and corporeal (so to speak) that it does not have life
and breath from some spiritual mystery.’６４
What is ‘corporeal’ in this context – as against what provides ‘life and
sensation’ or ‘life and breath’, and is therefore akin to the soul (anima６５) –
is not the mental disposition standing in the way of what is holy and
reasonable; it is simply the potentiality of palpable facts to be pervaded
by hidden meaning. As his hero St. Augustine will have taught More, it is
the promise of literal affairs and dealings hiding deeper layers of meaning
that renders the theme of body and mind particularly applicable as a
philosophical metaphor equal to the New Testament topic of the flesh
and the spirit. Because of the emphasis on the co-occurrence and coinci-
dence of what are in fact two separate levels of causality, worldly and
divine, the topic of body and soul here gives expression to the double-
layered structure of the events themselves, and thus develops into a kind
of a meta-metaphor, in which the soul acquires the symbolic meaning of
meaning itself, and the body that of its token or container.
The body at the same time being a symbol for man’s humble station in
comparison to God, More does not address the relation of body and mind
in order to draw up an anthropology that might function as a basis for
morality, but only in order to associate the body, just as he consequently
associates words and names, with the symbolic and spiritual meaning that
the sphere of the factual and the physical ultimately carries with it.６６ For
Thomas More, the web of references hidden in Scripture is always an
occasion to reflect on the duality between the observed facts and the
deeper meaning behind the scenes, as it were. It is in this sense, too, that
the notion of the body functions symbolically in More’s theology as a
stepping stone towards the divine.
64 More (1976b: 505-507; 1993; 93).
65 More (1976b: 505 and 507; 1993; 93).
66 Note that Benjamin Beier, who also comments on this passage, concludes that ‘the whole
passage affirms the body’s goodness and expresses the difficulty involved in giving a precise
account of the relationship between, not just the ordering of, body and soul.’ Beier (2015: 93).
Michael Kelly, for his part, concludes that ‘Thomas More’s ideas about the role of material things
in the economy of salvation represent elements of a coherent Incarnational theology that views
matter as a natural tool in the divine plan of redemption.’ Kelly (2015: 134).
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Erasmian humanism and Utopia
In his recurrent attacks on legalism and ritualism, Erasmus might at times
equally advocate a figurative reading of Scripture, and use the New Testa-
ment theme of the flesh and the spirit as a model for distinguishing alle-
gory from literalism, rather than reason from irrationality. Thomas More,
on the other hand, never makes the opposite move; from allegory to moral
psychology. Discussing More’s various ways of reflecting on the body, Ger-
main Marc’hadour, in the article referred to above, even observed that the
whole notion of the tripartite soul is missing in the works of More:
The subdivision of man into body, soul and spirit, so explicit in 1 Thessalonians
5:23, is reflected in both [John] Fisher and Erasmus, but does not seem to have
entered into More’s categories.６７
The reason was not that More did not know his Bible. Rather, the differ-
ence between Erasmus and More on this point indicates that whereas
theology always meant philosophy to Erasmus, it did not necessarily do
so for More. Neither, therefore, was More inclined to read Plato into St.
Paul in the way Erasmus did. Explaining the theologically pressing ques-
tion of how Christ allowed himself, as a divine person, to experience spe-
cific parts of human emotional life in his ‘final’ hours on earth, Erasmus
typically turned his attention to a moral philosophical analysis of mental
fights aimed at achieving victories over the lower self. In More’s Tristitia, by
contrast, references to the metaphor of body and soul primarily served to
highlight the hidden meaning of Scripture, so that More might attach to
the physical world a deeper, religious significance. Whereas for Erasmus
the soul was primarily involved in a continued fight against the body, for
More the body primarily figured as the organic bearer of religious symbo-
lism and spiritual meaning.
Returning to Utopia, we may now conclude that More fitted the image
of a worldly hedonist as little as Erasmus himself. But where does this leave
us with regard to our interpretation of the utopian dream? Is not Utopia at
least better adapted than the Folly to awaken in a present-day readership
the notion of a political dreamland, since it alludes to a joyful Epicurean
future on earth, whereas Erasmus’ book ultimately conveys only a rather
sombre message of Platonico-Christian renunciation? And how can it be
67 Marc’hadour (2006-2007: 104).
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that Utopia’s moral philosophy and social optimism seem to fit neither
Erasmus, nor More?
One way to answer these questions, is to argue that what More and
Erasmus wished for was somehow fundamentally at odds with what they
believed in. In an interesting book on Erasmus, More, and the idea of a
Utopia, Hanan Yoran has recently suggested that there is an internal con-
tradiction to ‘Erasmian humanism’ as such. Erasmian humanism, accord-
ing to Yoran, was a unique, politically charged type of humanism of which
Erasmus and More were the main representatives.６８ The movement was
characterized by a radical and activist agenda in favour of social change,
but ultimately failed to provide a viable program for this, since our Eras-
mian humanists were unable to conceptualize political ideals that were
too much at variance with the epistemological and ethical presuppositions
of the intellectual universe they inhabited.６９ Humanism, according to
Yoran, rejected (scholastic) metaphysical categories, bridged the gap be-
tween ‘the symbolic and the “real”’, and refused to accept ‘the traditional
distinction between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa’.７０ Erasmus
and More were both humanists, but their universalist political ideas did
not fit their humanism – which is why Erasmus’s and More’s works, ac-
cording to Yoran, are full of inconsistencies. Erasmus – to name only some
of the examples Yoran presents as symptoms of the contradictions internal
to his humanist activism – was ultimately ambivalent about monarchical
rule; dismissed in his political writings historical sources he elsewhere
prescribed as educational tools; and, as the famous colloquy The Godly
Feast indicates, could only fathom his own ideals to be realised in the
secluded area of a country house meeting of humanist friends.７１ The retreat
from the world in The Godly Feast, in particular, when moral and political
views were supposed to be put into practice in European society at large, is
symptomatic, according to Yoran; it is a ‘fictive – but ultimately deceptive
– refuge from the harsh truths about the impotency of Erasmian Human-
ism.’７２ Likewise, More too, or so Yoran claims, subverted and undermined
68 In Yoran’s formulation, ‘Erasmus and his followers created a humanist Republic of Letters as
a relatively autonomous sociointellectual space. They created the social identity, embodied first
and foremost by Erasmus himself, of the universal intellectual whose sole concern is the well-
being of Christendom as a whole.’ Yoran (2010: 37).
69 According to Yoran, the idea of the universal intellectual was an idea that ‘violated the basic
epistemological and ethical presuppositions’ of humanist discourse.’ Yoran (2010: 9).
70 Yoran (2010: 3-5); quotation from Yoran (2010: 4).
71 Yoran (2010: 108-109, 111-112, and 121-131).
72 Yoran (2010: 129).
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humanist discourse itself by his leanings towards Erasmian humanism;
first by offering no solution to his own ‘bleak diagnosis of the political
reality’ in Richard III; and then, in Utopia, by writing a book that contra-
dicts humanist institutions and practices at all levels, through its elimina-
tion of all cultural and symbolic forms of meaning from the economy,
ethics, and social order of Utopian society.７３
Are Erasmus and More really to be charged of undermining the ‘ontol-
ogy of humanist discourse’７４? Such a conclusion is unnecessary, I think, if
only because the contradictions Yoran notes may quite easily be explained
in the light of what we have been discussing. As for Erasmus, there is no
need to question the consistency of his social program as such. Rather than
the first modern intellectual,７５ Erasmus was a Christian philosopher. Not
only did this make him less interested in political questions such as
whether to support a monarchy or a democracy, it actually rendered this
question more or less pointless. In The Education of a Christian Prince,
Erasmus openly expressed his regret at the fact that Europe’s monarchs
were not chosen.７６ Yet in Erasmus’s religiously inspired version of political
idealism, this was in any case a question of minor concern, since whether it
is the king who rules, or the nobility, or the people, what counts for Eras-
mus is that they do so according to reason. Given the fact that there are
hereditary princes, Erasmus’s political treatise proposes to make good sta-
tesmen out of these rulers. Yet to follow Christ is everyone’s cause, accord-
ing to Erasmus. Presenting the novel idea of a universal spiritual edifica-
tion, all his works envision the formation of a social and political culture
based solely on the morality of its individual members. Rather than the
rule of kings, the rule of citizens, or even the rule of law, what mattered to
Erasmus was the rule of ethics. This was also the ideal Socrates had once
dreamt of. As a political goal, it may be said to have been Plato’s objective
as well, but it was an idealism seriously applied to society at large only in
post-Erasmian Europe.
There is thus no inconsistency in Erasmus’s way of addressing the rulers
rather than the multitudes of his times. Nor did he have any doubts about
what to teach a Christian Prince. Rather than being an inconsistent huma-
nist on the basis of his choice of classical sources, Erasmus had perfectly
73 See Chapters 5 and 6, respectively, in Yoran (2010); quotation from Yoran (2010: 158).
74 Yoran (2010: 182).
75 Note that, to Yoran’s eyes, the internal contradictions in More’s and Erasmus’s socio-political
humanism was a first sign of the internal paradoxes ‘characteristic of the position of the modern
intellectual’. Yoran (2010: 187).
76 Erasmus (1974: 136-137).
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good reasons to dismiss in his political writings the kind of historical
sources he may elsewhere have prescribed as educational tools. Julius
Caesar, for example, might well have written a very readable Latin, but
this did not make his expansionist ideas suitable reading materials for the
moral education of a young monarch. Finally, the ideal setting of a gather-
ing of humanist friends, though of course no guarantee for political
changes in society, was exactly the kind of small-scale example for the
large-scale development of a pious mental attitude that Erasmus wished
to export from the confines of the monastery to the Christian state as a
whole.
More, likewise, was never untrue to his Renaissance times. His theolo-
gical works indicate that, for all the presumed bleakness of his depiction of
the court of Richard III, or his model society in Utopia, there is little reason
to attribute to him a humanistic program of political engagement that is at
odds with the Renaissance tendency to attach symbolic significance to
social institutions or historical events. Despite his legal and historical in-
terest in human acts and political dealings, his religious motivations al-
ways left More plenty of room for distinguishing a level of divine orches-
tration that might give meaning to both political history and individual
human lives. In his religious works we accordingly meet a Thomas More
who cares neither for historical realism nor for philosophical idealism in
themselves, as much as he cares for the possibility always to attest to a
deep faith in the divine administration of things – a faith that no less
allowed him to be realistic, devotional and ironic at the same time.７７
There were indeed many ways of being a humanist, and if we wish to
value the significance of the humanist tradition for political history, a first
thing to notice is that, instead of denoting a shared epistemology – let
alone a common ‘humanist ontology’ – the fuzzy category of Renaissance
humanism in fact accommodated a great variety of philosophical and
political views. With respect to More’s penchant for realism and Erasmus’s
idealism, there is extra reason to reflect on the Dutchman’s interest in
moral philosophy and More’s interest in historical writings. In questions
of morality and politics, such a diversity of interests could easily result in
an intellectual responsiveness to either the notion of human perfectibility
or the idea of human incorrigibility – especially so in humanist times,
when scholars might develop a distinct fascination with either ancient
77 In the recentMoreana issue on ‘The Theology of Thomas More’, various contributions reflect
on the role of humour in More’s otherwise very serious works on religious questions. See the
reference to the issue in note 3, above.
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philosophers or classical historians. It is not without reason that Machia-
velli’s Prince of 1513, to take the most obvious example of political ‘realism’,
and Erasmus’s Education of a Christian Prince of 1516 are often presented as
complete opposites on the spectrum of the realism-idealism debate.７８ In
this case, too, positions taken to be representative of either a ‘realist’ or an
‘idealist’ interest in politics were to a large extent sustained on the basis of
a diversity of literary interests, and this should not surprise us. Whereas
historical sources tend to encourage – as well as to confirm the legitimacy
of – a certain naturalism towards the description of human conduct, moral
philosophy is ‘idealistic’ in and of itself. In Renaissance Europe, anthropo-
logical convictions may often have dwelt unconsciously, but my impres-
sion is that the disciplinary divide – along with other factors, such as
religious convictions７９ – often inspired anthropological beliefs as well,
ranging from naïve optimism to a dark pessimism with regard to the bet-
terment of man.８０
Early-modern realism and idealism might thus, amongst other things,
reflect an ambiguity within Renaissance culture itself,８１ but with respect to
More and Erasmus it will, I think, ultimately be more profitable to consider
another aspect of their intellectual concerns: Erasmus’s preoccupation
78 According to its modern editor, Erasmus’s Education of a Christian Prince, ‘takes precisely the
opposite point of view’ with respect to what ‘Machiavelli set out to define.’ Jardine (1997: vi and
vii). The difference between the two, one might say, is that Erasmus offers a ‘moral’ view on
politics, which is to say, a view on politics in which the Prince is told that he should follow certain
moral standards, whilst Machiavelli, on the other hand, presents a view of princes not so much as
they should be, at least not according to ethical standards, but as they have historically presented
themselves. For an elaboration of the realism-idealism theme, as well as a further comparison of
Erasmus and Machiavelli, see also Erik De Bom’s article in this volume.
79 Blaise Pascal’s anti-humanist stance in moral philosophy is a telling seventeenth-century
example of a religiously inspired scepticism vis-à-vis moral philosophical views. See van Ruler
(2009).
80 Significantly, it was another adept of the historical tradition, Thomas Hobbes, who would
later make explicit the opposition between his own realist views and the idealist conclusions of
the philosophers: ‘the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For
there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken
of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers.’ Hobbes (1981: 160). See also van Ruler (2009). For
further criticisms of philosophical idealism by authors within the historical tradition, see also the
examples of Machiavelli and Lipsius referred to in Erik De Bom’s article, below.
81 Although this is no immediate reason to deny More any moral or political optimism, or to
attribute to him a harsh realism comparable to that of Machiavelli or Hobbes; and although the
contrast between More and Erasmus is of a subtler nature than that between Erasmus and
Machiavelli – and thus more difficult to determine – we should neither underestimate the
potential depth of More’s irony vis-à-vis Erasmus on the basis of their disparate historical and
philosophical interests.
BODIES, MORALS, AND RELIGION
347VAN RULER
with a this-worldly application of religious maxims and More’s concern for
purely transcendent, rather than socially relevant forms of salvation – a
contrast that runs parallel to the contrast between their personality traits
and religious susceptibilities, rather than their literary interests. It is in
their theologies that their personalities show. Despite the fact that our
two ‘Oxford Reformers’ shared many important intellectual standpoints
and opinions, especially with respect to the application of a humanist
methodology in theology,８２More and Erasmus were ultimately theologians
of rather different sorts. If Erasmus was a very activist and rather philoso-
phical type of theologian, Thomas More, although a lawyer by profession,
was himself not only a theologian at heart, but a very contemplative and
soul-searching theologian at that.
The contrasting ways in which we saw Erasmus and More deal with the
Biblical theme of Christ’s suffering offers a graphic illustration, to my mind,
of the dissimilar religious susceptibilities between the two friends. Where
Erasmus’s Christian sentiment was driven by a this-worldly interest in
moral and social reform, More had a special penchant for a symbolic read-
ing of everyday experience. Paradoxically, their humanist ways of expres-
sions could equally serve both causes. Whenever Erasmus propounded the
moral and political belief in a transformation of society based on the
mental transformation of its individual members, he might do so in some
of the most ethereal terminology provided by the moral philosophical and
theological literature, and allude to Platonists and Christians as a class of
likeminded people who were as dead to the world as they were ecstatic in
82 As adherents of the ‘new learning’ and fellow-representatives of the party that valued the
Greek New Testament over the Vulgate, and prioritised an interpretation of its message tailored
to everyday concerns, Erasmus and More also followed John Colet in his critical stance towards
religious practices affected by ritualistic credulity. More, accordingly, often expressed religious
concerns very similar to those of Erasmus, especially in the years immediately following the
publication of Utopia. Nor could he, as his famous Letter to a Monk demonstrates very clearly,
be lured into distancing himself from the Erasmian cause. I cling to the expression ‘Oxford
Reformers’ since I feel it neatly captures the fact that John Colet played a pivotal role in encoura-
ging both Erasmus and More to develop an alternative to scholastic ways of theologizing as well
as to thoughtless ritualism in religion. Cf. Seebohm (1971). Note, however, that Seebohm’s epitaph
‘Oxford Reformers’ has become less current today than it originally was, no doubt due to a
present taste for less Wiggish interpretations of the period. Describing the cultural situation in
early sixteenth-century England, J.B. Trapp, for instance, proposed to give the name of ‘London
humanists’ to the party of Grocyn, William Lily, Colet, More and Linacre, ‘as they are best called,
rather than the Oxford Reformers’, reserving the title of ‘early Tudor Humanists’ for the three-
some that, as in Seebohm’s case, form the primary subject-matter of his book. Trapp (1991: 15).
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their minds. Yet in all of such cases, including the finale of The Praise of
Folly, these views no less remained part of a decidedly this-worldly project
of social change. More, on the other hand, had very different religious
interests. Indeed, the same biblical verse of 1 Corinthians 2:9 that tells us
of the unimaginable joys God has prepared for those who love him, might
be put into the this-worldly context of mental pleasures experienced by the
virtuous in Erasmus,８３ whilst serving only to sharpen the contrast between
this life and the next in More.８４
It is here that Giulia Sissa’s thesis may be of most significance. What if
Utopia, instead of embodying More’s own program for public reform, either
ironically addresses the de facto otherworldliness of Erasmus’s moral con-
cerns, or benevolently tries to contribute in More’s own personal way to
Erasmus’s program of social improvement? As I have said at the outset, I
shall not here attempt to settle the question to what extent Utopia may
reflect More’s own political views. Rather, I shall round off with a reflection
on how Utopia might be situated historically in view of the differences
between More and Erasmus.
Conclusion
However one might interpret More’s stance towards Erasmus, I take it that
Utopia was the best thing More could think of in replying to The Praise of
Folly. In Utopia, More involved Erasmus in a playful publication just as
Erasmus had involved him a few years earlier in his Folly. More’s book
does not do what Erasmus aimed to do himself, since it never seriously
addresses the topic of a transformation of individual minds as a precondi-
tion for social reform, nor the idea of that, in respect of the higher goal to
further the rule and triumph of reason, philosophy and religion coincide.
More simply had no affinity with these topics, just as, in his theological
works, he shows no concern for any practical or moral, rather than strictly
spiritual, motivations for mastering the self.
This leaves us with a variety of possibilities with respect to the way in
which More positioned himself vis-à-vis Erasmus in Utopia. If he wished to
be critical of his friend, for instance because he did not share Erasmus’s
optimism about the perfectibility of man, More may still have designed
Utopia as an alternative to Erasmus’s program; an alternative that argues in
83 Erasmus (1933: 120; 1979: 193; 1972: 730).
84 More (1976: 309).
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favour of changes to be made in the organisational set-up of society, rather
than the mental make-up of man.８５ One might also consider the possibility
that, fully in line with More’s other intellectual pursuits, Utopia supple-
ments Erasmus’s moral concerns with a focus on the physical rather than
the mental issues involved in thinking about society. Thus, Utopia’s em-
phasis on the corporeal side of human well-being, including its preoccupa-
tion with agricultural and economic conditions, might be read as an alter-
native to Erasmus’s more ethereal interpretation of human perfectibility.８６
One may also read the whole book as a parody, but there is room for a
further alternative. Since there is no reason to doubt that both authors, as
well as Peter Giles, the third friend involved, were all rather pleased with
More’s text, one might also read Utopia not so much as a criticism of, or a
substitute to, Erasmus’s views, but simply as a representation of Erasmian
utopianism in a style adapted to More’s own interests. Whatever Thomas
More himself may ultimately have thought of its content, Utopiamay then
offer an intriguing picture of what, according to More, was Erasmus’s posi-
tion, or of what, according to More, might result if Erasmus’s reasonable
Paradise were ever realised. In this sense, Utopia is a dummy-type descrip-
tion of Erasmian social reform. If it did not offer anything much by way of a
Philosophia Christi, Erasmus may still have agreed to many of its futuristic
ideas, even if they here come in the guise of social constraints rather than
reasonable choices.
Erasmus may also have liked More’s description of what an Erasmian
future would look like, even if we do not. Modern doubts about the ser-
iousness of Utopia’s vision of the future are often inspired by the fact that
present-day readers see many downsides to the ideal state it describes. If
we assume, as Paul Turner does in his introduction to the Penguin edition,
‘that Utopia is what it appears to be, a blueprint, however provisional, for a
perfect society’,８７ then why is it that the island of Utopia strikes us as
anything but a Land of Cockaigne? Or why is it that, as Hanan Yoran
noted, ‘many of the ideal state’s practices are oppressive and brutal even
by nonutopian standards’?８８ One solution to this problem is to see Utopia
‘though the eyes of its author, against the background of Tudor England,’ as
85 This is the position taken by Erik De Bom in his article on ‘Realism vs Utopianism’, below.
86 This would be in line with Guido Giglioini’s reading. Note that, in his article on More and
Smith, Giglioni argues that ‘as an attempt to solve the problem of a generalized condition of
dearth, Utopia is first and foremost about hunger.’ See below, p. 397.
87 Turner (2003: xvii).
88 Yoran (2010: 165). Yoran (2010: 165-177) offers an extended discussion of discontents with the
Utopian dream.
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Paul Turner suggests.８９ This, indeed, is a promising stratagem for interpret-
ing More as well as Erasmus. In 1516, Utopia’s strict social rules would have
offered large parts of the population an unprecedented sense of security.
Its idea, moreover, to give offenders official warnings first and only rela-
tively lenient penalties later, would have come as a welcome substitute to
the widespread torture and indiscriminate hangings in Renaissance Eur-
ope.９０ In this sense, More’s Utopia was politically ahead of its times as
much as Erasmus himself was.
Yet there is a deeper paradox to this kind of historical comparison, since
it not only tells us about pre-modern ideals, but just as much about our-
selves. If we wish to explain the ongoing popularity of such exceptional
works of Renaissance literature as More’s Utopia and Erasmus’s Folly, we
must also ask how the way in which we judge them relates to our own
moral and political preferences.
The reasonable hedonism of the Utopians may easily be interpreted
along the lines of a conception of human happiness and in terms of indi-
vidual freedoms we are generally very fond of today. Yet our own ideals of
freedom are as alien to Utopia as they were alien to both More and Eras-
mus. The Epicureanism More sketches was neither his own, nor in all
respects that of his friend, but what is more important, is that the personal
freedoms we are likely to associate with individual liberties, such as the
free choice and free expression of individual preferences in dress, political
ideas, as well as in moral and sexual comportment, or the ideal of being
able to maximise one’s positive (though possibly idiosyncratic) emotions,
are wholly exempt from Utopia, as they are exempt from the Folly, and
from any pre- or even early-modern moral or political treatise. It is not
that Erasmus or More disliked freedom, but that their concept of freedom
was very different from ours. Classical and early-modern authors were
inclined to interpret the notion in terms of the mental autonomy to com-
ply to a moral imperative, rather than in terms of the possibility to adhere
to personal preferences.
The contradiction is thus neither in Erasmus or More, but in the contra-
dictory moral demands addressed by Renaissance authors yearning for a
moral society on the one hand, and post-Romantic concerns addressed by
89 Turner (2003: xviii).
90 To quote Turner’s marvellous Introduction once more: ‘Compared to the nightmarish quality
of regal tyranny during the period, the pressure of public opinion in Utopia does not seem so very
terrible; and if adulterers have a rather hard time there, at least they are not disembowelled alive,
as More might easily have been, or, like three Carthusian monks convicted of the same crime,
kept standing bolt upright in fetters and iron collars for seventeen days.’ Turner (2003: xx).
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educated individuals arguably already living in a social Paradise on the
other.
Virtue came first. If we judge Utopia’s relation to political history from
this perspective, we may see how it in fact pictures the realisation of
Erasmian moral and religious ideals in an entirely honest way. It may
well be that it does so by offering a bleak picture of society, but this is not
the result of any inherent contradiction within the Renaissance world-out-
look. Rather, its matter-of-fact presentation of Utopian customs reflects the
down-to-earth character of the issues someone like More or Erasmus
might have liked to see changed.
In the attempt to bring his contemporaries to a higher level of moral
awareness, Erasmus consistently invited his fellow Christians to redirect
their mental energy towards an application of Christian piety and philoso-
phical virtue in all manners of life. If such a strategy may have seemed
idealistic at the time, there is every reason to be careful about calling it
‘idealistic’ in hindsight. Erasmus himself would have been totally amazed if
he could have witnessed the level of education of later generations, their
interest in questions of justice, or the daily business of millions of profes-
sionals in our own day and age who would never even dream of being
corrupt. Judging from The Education of a Christian Prince, with its emphasis
on educating the Prince in such a way that he might secure the common
good by a focus on revenue and taxation, on infrastructure and a strict
regulation of the magistracy, as well as on good education and the rule of
law, rather than on family interests and wars of succession, we may well
ask whether it was not Erasmus who ultimately proved to be more of a
realist – at least in comparison to his pessimistic contemporary Machia-
velli, whose political views are hardly of relevance for understanding civil
society.
One might pose a similar question with respect to Erasmus and More. If
Utopia’s ongoing appeal rests first and foremost on its presentation of a
fully realised political Paradise, we may well ask which of the two ideas has
had most cultural significance five hundred years beyond: Erasmus’s uto-
pian program of mental transformation and educational reform, or More’s
sample vision of an Erasmian society? Either way, both ideas have been
remarkably effective since 1516. Whereas Erasmus only advocated a mental
transformation towards reason, Utopia may well have been conceived first
and foremost as a good-humoured, possibly even charitable, prediction of
what might come of this.
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